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During the last two decades, scholars from a variety of disciplines have argued that civil society is structurally 
deficient in post-communist countries. Yet why have the seemingly strong, active and mobilized civic move-
ments of the transition period become so weak after democracy was established? And why have there been di-
verging political trajectories across the post-communist space if civil society structures were universally weak? 
This paper uses a wide range of data from various available sources to show that civil societies in Central and 
Eastern European countries are not as feeble as is commonly assumed. Some post-communist countries possess 
vigorous public spheres, and active civil society organizations strongly connected to transnational civic net-
works able to shape domestic policies. Following the calls by Anheier (2004) and Bernhard and Karakoç (2007) 
we adopt a multidimensional approach to the measurement of civil society. In a series of cross-section time-
series models, we show that our broader measures of civic and social institutions are able to predict the diverg-
ing transition paths among post-communist regimes, and in particular the growing gap between democratic East 
Central Europe and the increasingly authoritarian post-Soviet space.
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The Weakness of PosT-CommunisT 
Civil soCieTy Reassessed
 
During the last two decades, scholars from a variety 
of disciplines have argued that civil society is struc-
turally deficient in post-communist countries (Lo-
max 1997, Ely 1994, Staniszkis 1999, Jawlowska 
and Kubik 2007, Civil Society Forum 2009). Early 
studies of ‘social capital’ conducted in the 1990s 
found lower levels of social trust, community en-
gagement, and confidence in social and political in-
stitutions across Central and Eastern Europe (Rose 
1999, Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1996). More re-
cent analyses by Howard (2003) Bernhard and Kara-
koç (2007) and Wallace, Pichler and Haerpfer (2012) 
have shown low levels of voluntary associational 
membership and weak unconventional participation. 
The picture of even the most successful post-com-
munist countries that arises from the literature is one 
of ‘democracies without citizens’, in which elites 
have succeeded in institutionalizing democratic pro-
cedures, protection of basic civic rights, and mul-
tiparty competition, but failed to counter a paucity 
of associational life, volunteering at the grassroots 
level and weak participation in the institutions of 
representative governance. Weak civil society spells 
trouble for these new democracies. Warning of the 
dangers to democratic consolidation, some authors 
have pointed to declining legitimacy of democratic 
institutions, disenchantment with liberal values, and 
“Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak 
civic traditions before the advent of Communism, and 
totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social 
capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of 
civic engagement, the Hobbesian outcome of the Mez-
zogiorno – amoral familialism, clientelism, lawlessness, 
ineffective government, and economic stagnation – seems 
likelier than successful democratization and economic 
development. Palermo may represent the future of Mos-
cow.”
 - Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 1993, p. 183
the growing popularity of populist and radical right 
parties (Ramet 1999, Minkenberg 2002, Kopecky 
and Mudde 2003, Rupnik 2007). 
Yet if we take the conventional wisdom regard-
ing the weakness of post-communist civil society 
at its face value, this seems to generate a number 
of paradoxes. First, the events of 1989-1991 were 
initially considered as the undisputable triumph of 
civil society over monolithic communist regimes: 
why, therefore, have the seemingly strong, active 
and mobilized civic movements of the transition 
period become so weak after democracy was estab-
lished? Second, given that communist regimes did 
not simply repress independent social and political 
organizations, but actively built their own associa-
tional structures, what happened to these structures 
during and after the transition period? And finally, 
if civil society matters for democratic consolidation 
but is uniformly weak, why are there diverging po-
litical trajectories across the post-communist space, 
with post-Soviet regimes lapsing into authoritarian 
rule while those of East Central Europe hold to the 
path of democratic consolidation?
 
We suggest these paradoxes are easily resolved once 
we depart from the consensus view that civil society 
is weak and structurally deficient in post-communist 
Europe. Because existing studies have focused ex-
clusively on membership levels in voluntary asso-
ciations as reflected in public opinion surveys at the 
expense of other dimensions of civic life and other 
types of empirical data, they have neglected the myr-
iad ways in which citizens organize to defend their 
interests, reaffirm their identities and pursue com-
mon goals. Thus in order to map up the actual state 
and development of civil society in the region we 
need to follow calls by Anheier (2004) and Bernhard 
and Karakoç (2007) to adopt a multidimensional ap-
proach to the measurement of civil society. We also 
need to focus on really existing civil societies (Alex-
ander 2006) and expand types of data and research 
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strategies to identify emerging forms of civil society 
and their impact on politics in formerly communist 
countries. We argue that using a wide range of data 
from various available sources and more in-depth 
empirical analysis, it can be shown that civil societ-
ies in Central and Eastern European countries are not 
as feeble as is commonly assumed. Some post-com-
munist countries developed vigorous public spheres 
and have active civil society organizations strongly 
connected to transnational civic networks able to 
shape domestic policies. The diversity of outcomes 
among post-communist regimes, and in particular 
the growing gap between democratic East Central 
Europe and the increasingly authoritarian post-Sovi-
et space (Ekiert, Kubik and Vachudova 2007), reflect 
in part patterns of civil society development and is 
mirrored by the diversity in civic and social institu-
tions, reflecting different historical legacies, political 
trajectories, and cultural traditions. 
The Weakness of Civil Society Thesis
By the late 1990s, scholars from a range of disci-
plines appeared to have reached a consensus on the 
systemic weakness of civil society in post-commu-
nist Europe (Dahrendorf 1990, Bernhard 1996, How-
ard 2003). Some attributed this to a direct legacy of 
communism, arguing that ‘the lack of civil society 
was part of the very essence of the all-pervasive 
communist state’ (Wedel 1994: 323). Others attrib-
uted it to the weak civic traditions before the outset 
of communist rule and only reinforced by it (Putnam 
1993). Still others argued that, while the legacy of 
communism was undoubtedly negative, it was com-
pounded by the manner in which the post-1989 dem-
ocratic transformations occurred: pacted transitions 
privileged elite negotiations at the expense of popu-
lar forces, and organizational leadership of emerg-
ing popular movements was lost through migration 
to the new state bureaucracies and party hierarchies, 
and structural adjustment and austerity led to wide-
spread withdrawal from associational life (Bernhard 
1996, Lomax 1997, Howard 2003). Thus, the rebel-
lious civil societies that challenged communist gov-
ernments in the region subsequently became enfee-
bled, as a result of factors inherent in the nature of the 
dual economic and political transformation occurring 
across the post-communist space.
Notwithstanding this assessment, however, since 
1989 most countries of the region have experienced 
steady democratic consolidation. A glance at the 
Freedom House rankings illustrates both the overall 
progress and the contrasting trajectories of political 
transformations (Figure 1).  
Outside of Central Asia, less than 15 per cent of post-
communist regimes are considered ‘not free,’ ac-
cording to the ratings published by Freedom House 
(Freedom House 2008), and, in a number of post-
communist polities, the quality of democracy is very 
high, with many countries in Central Europe and the 
Baltics exhibiting better ratings on indices of corrup-
tion, public service delivery, and business regulation 
than their counterparts in Southern Europe (World-
wide Governance Indicators 2009, Doing Business 
Indicators 2010, Transparency International 2010). 
Thus if is true, that civil society is an indispensable 
element of the development and consolidation of de-
mocracy1, how can we explain how democracy has 
flourished in parts of the former Soviet bloc, despite 
the apparent weakness of the associational sphere 
and passivity of citizens described by scholars?
Comparisons of the state of civil society in post-com-
munist countries, we would respond, have been based 
on a relatively small number of indicators, which has 
1   See, for example, Shils 1991; Diamond 1999; Rosenblum 
and Park 2002 for arguments on the role of civil society and 
for a skeptical evaluation of such claims see Berman 1997 and 
Bermeo (2003, pp. 8-11). See also Fung 2003 Alagappa 2004.
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led to a false impression of the depth and robustness 
of post-communist associational life. Early studies 
of ‘social capital’ in post-communist countries con-
ducted in the 1990s, for example, utilized survey in-
struments for social trust, community engagement, 
and confidence in social institutions, all of which 
were reported to be lower in Central and Eastern 
Europe than in the West (Rose 1999, Rose, Mishler 
and Haerpfer 1996, Wallace, Pischler and Haerpfer 
2012). Howard (2003) pointed to data collected as 
part of the 1995-7 World Values Surveys, showing 
low levels of voluntary association across all coun-
tries in the region, and across many categories of as-
sociational membership. Much of the weakness of 
civil society argument hinges upon these measures, 
and related questions in the European and the Inter-
national Social Surveys (ESS 2003-7, ISSP 1988-, 
WVS 1981-2007). In general, there remains a strik-
ing disconnect between the richness of the theoreti-
cal literature on civil society, and the narrow nature 
of the data collected and reported in discussions of 
civic society in post-communist Europe. Important 
dimensions, such as institutional infrastructure, the 
quality of public space, access to the media and the 
degree of political information, connections to global 
civil society, or the frequency and effectiveness of 
protest and contentious political activity, are almost 
entirely absent (Bernhard and Karakoç 2007). Civil 
society is a multidimensional phenomenon and needs 
to be measured as such.
In this paper we employ a broad, realistic, and em-
pirically sensitive notion of civil society. Following 
Diamond (1999, 221), we define it as “the realm of 
organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-gen-
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Figure 1: Civil rights and political liberties in Europe 1981-2009
Source: Freedom House.
Country coding: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia (Cen-
tral Europe and Baltics); Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia (South 
East Europe); Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (Central Asia); 
Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine (Post-Soviet Europe); Greece, Portugal, Spain (Southern 
Europe); Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Swe-
den, United Kingdom (Western Europe).
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Civil societies in Post-communist world
The Organizational Structure of Civil Society
Studies of civil society in post-communist Europe 
have tended to rely on simple surveys of voluntary 
activity, where respondents are asked to report the 
different kinds of association in which they partici-
pate, rather than studies of organizational compo-
sition of civil society and density of organizations 
across space and time. This has led to an excessive 
focus upon individuals instead of the organizations 
within which they operate as well as to the neglect of 
the associational sphere that existed under the com-
munist rule and its transformations after 1989. 
It has also led to a little-noticed inconsistency in the 
data on organizational membership in post-commu-
nist states. On the one hand, comparative survey data 
from the European Social Survey or the European 
Values Survey has shown a consistently low level of 
reported group membership, with little or no change 
over time (Table 3). On the other hand, official reg-
istries from within individual countries show a phe-
nomenal growth of listed groups and organizations 
(Nagy and Sebesteny 2008; Mansfeldova at al 2004; 
Kuti 2010). In Poland, for example, the number of 
registered NGOs grew by 400 percent from 1989 to 
1994 (Figure 2). 
While the growth leveled after that point, it has re-
mained strong in the subsequent years, with an av-
erage addition of some 4000 new NGOs, and 500 
foundations, every year, across all types or organi-
zations (Table 1), in all regions of the country. The 
development of civil society organizations has been 
distributed across the entire range of localities and 
not restricted to major urban centers2. 
2   In big cities (over half a million inhabitants) there 24.1% 
registered NGOs, in villages 19.7%, in small cities (up to 99 
erating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous 
from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of 
shared rules.... it involves citizens acting collectively 
in a public sphere to express their interests, passions, 
preferences, and ideas, to exchange information, to 
achieve collective goals, to make demands on the 
state, to improve the structure and functioning of the 
state, and to hold state officials accountable.” Given 
the emerging consensus that civil society is a mul-
tidimensional and interactive phenomenon (Bermeo 
and Nord, eds. 2000; Merkel 2002; Anheier 2004), 
we assume that really existing civil societies differ 
along at least four crucial dimensions: the quality of 
the public sphere, civil society’s composition and 
organization, its interaction with other institutional 
domains and actors of the polity, and normative ori-
entation of civil society actors. Specific dimensions 
or sectors of civil society in various countries may 
exhibit different levels of development and different 
qualities and thus their impact on democratization 
(or the improvement of democracy’s quality) may 
vary considerably. Accordingly, only multiple data 
and multiple methodologies can generate substantive 
knowledge about civil society and way in which it 
shapes political outcomes.
Taking a broader sample of indicators, we ar-
gue, it is possible to build a picture of civil 
society that better reflects the richness and 
diversity of citizen activity across post-com-
munist countries, and also helps us to under-
stand the diverging trajectories of post-1989 
political and economic developments. In the 
following section we will focus on each of 
these four dimensions presenting various 
empirical data that may allow us to judge 
the condition of civil society across the post-
communist region. 
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Perhaps this trend is unique to Poland and other East 
Central European countries (Kuti 1996 and 2010, 
Mansfeldova at al 2004, Nagy and Sebesteny 2008); 
yet further evidence of civil society organizational 
thousand inhabitants) 34.7% and larger in cities (100-499 
thousand inhabitants) 21.5% (Gasior-Niemiec and Glinski 
2007a, 246). While, there is a considerable controversy how 
many of these registered organizations still exist and how 
active there are (reference), the rate of NGO creation when 
combine with other measures provide a testimony to the con-
siderable vitality of civil society.
growth across the region can be adduced from data 
on membership of international non-governmental 
organizations. A measure of per capita membership 
of international NGOs, for example, is reported in 
the LSE Global Civil Society Yearbook (LSE 2000-
4), and shows a massive surge in civic organization 
among post-communist societies in the decade from 
1993 to 2003 (Figure 3). 
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Figure 2: Growth of NGOs and Foundations in Poland
Type of organization 2002 2008
NGOs (stowarzyszenia) 36,500 63,500
Foundations 5,000 9,500
Voluntary Fire Brigades 12,500 15,000
Social organizations (PTA, etc.) 6,650 4,000
Trade Unions 15,700 19,500
Religious organizations 14,800 15,500
Professional and employer associations 4,250 5,500
Sport clubs 4,300 6,000
Number of Organizations 99,700 138,500
Table 1: Growth across types of organizations in Poland
Source: Klon/Jawor, GUS. Data do not include all organizations that comprise broadly define civil society and 
include some that may not be active.
7ces papers - open forum # 11, 2012
During the first decade and a half following the col-
lapse of communism, central Europe rapidly over-
took southern Europe in terms of the density of inter-
national NGOs, and is now converging on Western 
Europe in this regard. Meanwhile, Southeastern Eu-
rope is now approaching the consolidated democra-
cies of southern Europe in the richness and diversity 
of international organizations active in the country. 
The data indicates not only rapid change over time, 
but also a widening gap between regions of the for-
mer communist bloc, with a clear divide emerging 
between post-Soviet Europe and the other countries 
of the former Eastern bloc. 
If the growth of new civil society organizations dur-
ing the transition period has remained invisible to 
public opinion surveys, so too have the associations 
inherited from the former regime. Classic studies of 
communist regimes always emphasized their high or-
ganizational density and mobilizational capacity, as 
citizens were forced or encouraged to join party-state 
controlled mass organizations, spanning the entire 
spectrum of activities from leisure, to the profession-
al sphere, to neighborhood life, to high politics (Linz 
1975, Kubik 2000: 184-85). These organizations 
were dubbed “transmission belts” since they allowed 
the center of power to reach and control all citizens 
(Selznik 1962). Moreover, researchers in the region 
showed that a non-trivial number of pre-communist 
organizations survived under communist rule. While 
the authorities tightly controlled such organizations, 
they were able to protect their specific traditions and 
continued to perform many of their traditional so-
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Figure 3.  International NGO membership density (per million population)
Source: LSE Global Civil Society Yearbook (2000-3).
Country coding: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia (Central Europe and Baltics); Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Mace-
donia, Romania, Serbia (South East Europe); Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan (Central Asia); Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, 
Ukraine (Post-Soviet Europe); Greece, Portugal, Spain (Southern Europe); Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United 
Kingdom (Western Europe). 
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cial functions (Kurczewska 2004; Kurczewski 2003, 
Gasior-Niemiec and Glinski 2007a). If communist 
regimes had such a dense state-imposed associa-
tional life in the communist past, what happened to 
these organizations in the process of transition?  It 
is especially puzzling why the presence of surviving 
old and emerging new organizations should not be 
detected in survey data on group membership, which 
consistently shows Central and Eastern European so-
cieties to be among the least organizationally dense 
in the world (Bernhard and Karakoç, 2007). 
The most common interpretation of this finding 
is that there was ‘civic demobilization’ following 
the end of communism. Communist regimes were 
successful in maintaining a high level of member-
ship in associations only via threat of sanctions and 
withdrawal of various benefits that were distributed 
through various associations. Thus, the collapse of 
communist systems was followed by widespread 
withdrawal from communist era organizations and 
aversion to joining new ones. Moreover, the with-
drawal from associational life was also attributed to 
the severity of the economic crisis and loss of leader-
ship civil society activists migrated to politics and 
state administration (Bernhard 1996). This is the 
claim advanced by Howard (2003), who compares 
levels of voluntary organizational membership from 
the 1990 and 1995 World Values Surveys, and re-
ports that most post-communist societies have fallen 
in ranking when compared with post-authoritarian 
regimes. Support for this thesis is adduced from data 
showing that rates of volunteering are very low in 
the region in comparison to old EU countries (Nalecz 
and Bartkowski 2006). However, more focused opin-
ion polls usually show higher levels of volunteering 
than general surveys such as the International or the 
European Social Survey. For example, the numbers 
reported by Gaskin and Smith (1997) for two post-
communist countries are not strikingly lower than 
the numbers for Western European countries. Sys-
tematic surveys in Poland also registered a relatively 
high, although fluctuating, level of volunteering and 
charitable giving (CBOS 2010a, 2010b, 2010c).
The argument is advanced further with the help 
of data from the Post-Communist Organizational 
Membership Study (PCOMS), which shows slight 
declines in organizational membership in two post-
communist countries (Eastern Germany and Russia) 
from 1995-1999 (Howard 2003). 
Revisiting this issue with the benefit of the more re-
cent 2005-2007 wave of the World Values Surveys, 
however, allows us to gain a more complete picture 
of change in time across the region (Table 3).
Table 2. Volunteers as Percentage of Adult Population in Europe 1995
Source: Gaskin and Smith 1997.
Tables
Table 2. Volunteers as Percentage of Adult Population in Europe 1995
Country Volunteers
Belgium 32%
Bulgaria 19%
Denmark 28%
Germany 18%
Great Britain 34%
Ireland 25%
Netherlands 38%
Slovenia 36%
Sweden 36%
Source: Gaskin and Smith 1997.
Table 3. Average ‘Active Membership’ of Civic Organizations, 1995-2005
Average 
memberships, 
1995
Average 
memberships, 
2005
Change 
(abs.)
Percentage 
Change
Ukraine 1.50 3.13 1.63 +108.3
Slovenia 4.50 8.38 3.88 +86.1
Moldova 4.25 6.00 1.75 +41.2
Serbia 2.50 2.88 0.38 +15.0
Russia 2.25 2.38 0.13 +5.6
Bulgaria 1.75 1.38 -0.38 -21.4
Germany (East) 7.75 5.13 -2.63 -33.9
Romania 5.75 2.00 -3.75 -65.2
Source: World Values Surveys, waves 3 and 5 (1994-1998 and 2005-7).
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While the changes from 1995-7 to 2000-7 are rela-
tively slight, they do not support the hypothesis that 
civil society has undergone any recent weakening in 
post-communist Europe. Confirming the compari-
son of WVS and PCOMS data in Howard’s analy-
sis (2003), East Germany exhibits a downward shift, 
with a 33.8% decline in organizational membership 
over the decade; also on a clear downtrend is Ro-
mania, where average active organizational mem-
bership has declined from 5.75 per person to just 2, 
largely driven by a surprising fall in religious asso-
ciation. On the other hand Russia, which is shown 
in the PCOMS data as having a slight decline from 
1995-1999, ends virtually unchanged over the de-
cade, with an increase of 5 per cent up until the lat-
est survey in 2006, while in other cases voluntary 
associational membership has clearly increased. 
Average voluntary membership more than doubling 
in Ukraine and increasing by 86 per cent in Slove-
nia. As these changes are from a very low base, they 
should not be over-interpreted; but at any rate they 
do not support a hypothesis of civic disengagement 
or ‘stagnation’ in post-communist Europe3. 
3   However, in accordance with the view that totalitarian 
societies were particularly devastating in terms of their impact 
upon ‘private’ civic life involving religious, recreational, or 
social activities, the areas of civic association which have seen 
the fastest recovery in the post-communist era are precisely in 
apolitical organizations such as sports clubs, cultural groups 
and (apart from Romania) religious organizations. 
It may be the case, however, that withdrawal from 
associations did occur quite rapidly immediately fol-
lowing the collapse of the socialist regime, before 
data collection for the third wave of the World Val-
ues Surveys began in 1994. Data from the most re-
cent wave of the European Social Survey, collected 
in 2006, includes an item on whether respondents are 
currently or formerly members of trade unions - an 
integral feature of the ‘transmission belt’ linking the 
party and society under communist rule. The results 
show that in all of the former Communist countries, 
between a fifth (in Poland) and over half of all re-
spondents (in Estonia and the Ukraine) have left the 
unions which were so encompassing during the com-
munist era (Table 4). 
The figures shown in Table 4 do indeed suggest that, 
in the immediate aftermath of transition, there was in-
deed a partial withdrawal from the mass associations 
of the communist state. However, the trade union 
movement did not collapse entirely; while the levels 
of membership in trade unions declined significantly 
over the last two decades, the resultant level is not 
much different from the European average (Visser 
2006). This is particularly the case when one notes 
the outlier position of the Scandinavian countries, 
compared against the western European nations that 
Table 3. Average ‘Active Membership’ of Civic Organizations, 1995-2005
Source: World Values Surveys, waves 3 and 5 (1994-1998 and 2005-7).
Tables
Table 2. Volunteers as Percentage of Adult Population in Europe 1995
Country Volunteers
Belgium 32%
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Germany 18%
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Ireland 25%
Netherlands 38%
Slovenia 36%
Sweden 36%
Source: Gaskin and Smith 1997.
Table 3. Average ‘Active Membership’ of Civic Organizations, 1995-2005
Average 
memberships, 
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Average 
memberships, 
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(abs.)
Percentage 
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Ukraine 1.50 3.13 1.63 +108.3
Slovenia 4.50 8.38 3.88 +86.1
Moldova 4.25 6.00 1.75 +41.2
Serbia 2.50 2.88 0.38 +15.0
Russia 2.25 2.38 0.13 +5.6
Bulgaria 1.75 1.38 -0.38 -21.4
Germany (East) 7.75 5.13 -2.63 -33.9
Romania 5.75 2.00 -3.75 -65.2
Source: World Values Surveys, waves 3 and 5 (1994-1998 and 2005-7).
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Yes,
currently
Yes,
previously No 
    
Denmark  63.13 21.92 14.95 
Sweden  55.75 20.75 23.5 
Finland  50.21 22.15 27.64 
Norway  41.25 19.34 39.42 
Belgium  32.48 17.46 50.06 
Austria  19.1 18.63 62.28 
Ireland  18.97 23.85 57.18 
Ukraine  18.62 51.66 29.72 
Netherlands  18.06 11.47 70.47 
Cyprus  17.22 16.29 66.49 
Slovenia  16.87 34.63 48.5 
Russian Federation  15.72 47.53 36.75 
United Kingdom  15.61 29.3 55.09 
Switzerland  11.89 9.5 78.61 
Hungary  10.21 40.32 49.47 
Slovakia  9.89 38.68 51.44 
Germany  9.51 27.08 63.4 
Spain  8.5 7.49 84.01 
Estonia  7.15 50.83 42.03 
France  6.55 15.96 77.49 
Portugal  5.92 9.04 85.04 
Poland  5.72 21.53 72.75 
Bulgaria  5.36 46.84 47.8 
Table 4. Are You a Member of a Trade Union?
Source: European Social Survey, Wave 3 (2004). Former communist countries highlighted.
have a legacy of authoritarian rule, such as Portu-
gal, Germany, or Spain, the former communist coun-
tries of central and eastern Europe perform relatively 
well.  Moreover, membership in other (especially 
professional) associations remained relatively stable, 
as the data from Poland suggests (Table 5).
In general, therefore, we appear to find a disparity 
between comparative survey projects, which reveal 
low rates of reported voluntary activity, and a wealth 
of organizational data from official registries and in-
ternational non-governmental organizations which 
imply a dense and growing civic life. What can ex-
plain this inconsistency? While we cannot be sure 
of an ultimately adequate response to this question, 
one suggestion may be that one needs to examine the 
meaning of voluntary association in the post-com-
munist context. Due to the legacy of state-mobilized 
engagement under communist rule and widespread 
distaste for formal membership in any association, 
there may be a large survey response bias in post-
communist countries that leads household survey 
instruments to underestimate the true level of par-
ticipation in associational life. This is the only way 
that it is possible to reconcile the exceptionally low 
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cal aspects of associational life, such as membership 
in voluntary organizations, to the exclusion of the 
active political behaviors, such as demonstrations, 
strikes or petition, which are more directly relevant 
to explaining institutional outcomes. A greater focus 
on protest activity would also be consistent with a 
long tradition in behavioral political science focus-
ing upon elite-challenging activities (Dalton 2008, 
Norris 1999 2002), as well as empirical studies link-
ing expressive values and democratic outcomes (In-
glehart and Welzel 2005). 
In their study of contention during initial years of 
political and economic transformations, Ekiert and 
Yes,
currently
Yes,
previously No 
    
Denmark  63.13 21.92 14.95 
Sweden  55.75 20.75 23.5 
Finland  50.21 22.15 27.64 
Norway  41.25 19.34 39.42 
Belgium  32.48 17.46 50.06 
Austria  19.1 18.63 62.28 
Ireland  18.97 23.85 57.18 
Ukraine  18.62 51.66 29.72 
Netherlands  18.06 11.47 70.47 
Cyprus  17.22 16.29 66.49 
Slovenia  16.87 34.63 48.5 
Russian Federation  15.72 47.53 36.75 
United Kingdom  15.61 29.3 55.09 
Switzerland  11.89 9.5 78.61 
Hungary  10.21 40.32 49.47 
Slovakia  9.89 38.68 51.44 
Germany  9.51 27.08 63.4 
Spain  8.5 7.49 84.01 
Estonia  7.15 50.83 42.03 
France  6.55 15.96 77.49 
Portugal  5.92 9.04 85.04 
Poland  5.72 21.53 72.75 
Bulgaria  5.36 46.84 47.8 
Table 5. Membership in selected associations in Poland
Source: Polish Statistical Office.
(and volatile) levels of surveyed voluntary activity 
with the stable and rising official registries of NGOs 
and NGO membership, without questioning the reli-
ability of the latter, or the myriad other indicators we 
have presented suggesting a more robust civic life in 
the region than is commonly assumed.
The Behavior of Civil Society Actors
As observed by Bernhard and Karakoç (2007), stud-
ies of civil society have tended to focus on apoliti-
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Kubik (1998) noted striking differences among four 
Central European countries in number of protests 
sponsored by civil society organizations (Figure 4). 
They argued that while some civil societies in the re-
gion could be described as ‘accommodating’, others 
were clearly ‘confrontational,’ and as such character-
ized by frequent strikes, demonstrations, and other 
contentious activities. 
These trends tend to persist overtime suggesting that 
specific traits of civil society behavior are repro-
duced and persist for long periods. Data for conten-
tious behavior in Poland and Hungary illustrate well 
this regularity.
Other data suggest that participation in contentious 
events, such as demonstration or strikes, has fallen 
since the 1989-1992 period in all post-communist 
countries, though this may largely reflect the un-
usually heightened level of contention induced by 
the transition process (Figure 5). A de-emphasis on 
the more confrontational forms of civic activism is 
most evident in the post-Soviet countries and East 
Central Europe, and less so in southeastern Europe. 
Thus, both the least and the most democratic post-
communist countries registered the steepest drops in 
contention4.  
4   It is also important to note that in non-democratic countries 
of the former Soviet bloc there are recurring waves of civil 
society mobilization. So-called “colored revolutions” mark 
periods of the heightened political crisis usually centered 
around contested elections. These are cases of rapid mobiliza-
tion and emergence of civic movements that are followed by 
de-mobilization, organizational atrophy and passivity of civil 
society actors (Bunce and Volchik 2006, D’Anieri 2006, Hale 
2006, Kuzio 2006). Not surprisingly, in the least democratic 
post-communist countries there is a much lower level of 
sustainability of civil society organizations even following the 
periods of significant public mobilization.
Figure 4.  Protest days in East Central Europe 1989-1994
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Why does this decline in contentious politics occur? 
While it may be evidence of a civic ‘demobilization’, 
we would argue that it is more consistent with a view 
that the transition period saw a spike in contention 
due to economic austerity, the onset of multiparty 
politics, and distributional conflicts arising from 
privatization and welfare reform. A similar spike and 
decline can be seen in other countries undergoing a 
transition from authoritarian rule to democracy, such 
as South Africa, Chile, or Mexico: in South Africa, 
the proportion of the public claiming to have taken 
or been prepared to take part in a demonstration fell 
from 76 to 58 per cent in the 1990s; in Chile, the fall 
was from 56 to 41 per cent, and in Mexico from 79 to 
59 per cent. On this basis, while the fall in the former 
Soviet bloc countries was indeed very sharp, the lev-
els of civic activism in Central European countries 
such as Poland (60 to 54 per cent), the Czech Repub-
lic (80 to 85 per cent) or Slovakia (79 to 82 per cent) 
in fact seem comparatively robust. 
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Normative orientation of civil society actors
In addition to their behavior, the values of civil soci-
ety actors matter greatly in determining the political 
outcomes of their activities. Structural characteristics 
of civil society such as density or sectoral compo-
sition are not crucial for its democracy facilitating 
functions but the goals and objectives of civil soci-
ety actors are. In terms of the political orientation of 
civil society actors, a distinction is sometimes made 
between liberal and ‘illiberal’ civil societies. Berman 
(1997) provides a notable example in the case of Wei-
mar Germany where a dense and vibrant civil society 
ultimately contributed to the fall of democracy and 
facilitated the rise of the Nazi regime. In addition, 
values and preferences may determine whether civil 
society develops along programmatic or clientelistic 
lines, that is, whether civil society organizations ex-
ist to defend citizen rights, work for public good and 
Figure 5. Protest days in Poland and Hungary 1989-2004.*
*   Data from the project on The Logic of Civil Society in New Democracies: Hungary, Poland, South 
Korea and Taiwan coordinated by Grzegorz Ekiert, Jan Kubik and Jason Wittenberg.
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advance the rule of law and democratic process, or 
simply as a means of extracting material rents for 
their leaders and members from the state and local 
administration. 
There is no systematic data to assess the normative 
orientations of civil society organizations similar to, 
for example, party manifestos analysis. While spe-
cific groups of organizations (trade unions, NGOs 
or religious organizations) are commonly associated 
with distinct ideological positions, surveys may be 
the only means to assess normative orientations of 
specific civil societies. One of the most longstand-
ing indicators of the liberal commitment of civil so-
ciety actors is the degree to which citizens possess a 
normative commitment to democracy (Almond and 
Verba 1963).  Public opinion surveys often solicit the 
view whether democracy is a ‘good’, ‘very good’, 
‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ way to run the country, and these 
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trends, based on the World Value Survey data, are 
shown for the four clusters of post-communist soci-
eties in the Figure below (Figure 7). The normative 
commitment to democracy is evidently weak among 
the post-Soviet states, yet it stands almost as high 
in Southeastern Europe, as is the cases in Southern 
and Western Europe. Central Europe, meanwhile, fits 
somewhere in-between the two. In terms of change 
over time, affective support for democracy has also 
consolidated in the post-Soviet countries, albeit from 
a very low starting point. 
Post-communist civil societies also fare well with 
regard to the extent to which they are programmatic 
rather than clientelist in function. As one indicator 
which may detect the extent to which civic move-
ments serve to advance the interest of citizens, rather 
than their own private interests, we can take the de-
gree trust that survey respondents express to have 
in the civil society organizations of their country. In 
central Europe and post-Soviet Europe, the public’s 
evaluation of the civic sector is comparable to that 
found in Southern and Western Europe; only in the 
Balkans and Central Asia, does this confidence lag 
behind, possibly reflecting a greater degree of clien-
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telism and cooptation. Also charted is the trend over 
time in trust in civil society organizations since 1990. 
These trends clearly suggest that the transition from 
single party rule to pluralism has seen a consolida-
tion of public trust in the civic sector, for public trust 
in non-government organizations has grown across 
all post-communist societies since 1990. 
Finally, some evidence of the consolidation of a 
democratic culture can be found in the left-right po-
larization of respondents. Since Bell (1960) it has 
been argued that ideological differences narrow as 
countries develop economically; and empirical evi-
dence suggests this has indeed occurred across West-
ern democracies (Dalton 2005). However, in the new 
democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, the con-
cern has often been expressed that far from converg-
ing on the median, ideological divisions have wid-
ened, with the growing popularity of populist and 
radical right parties (Ramet 1999, Minkenberg 2002, 
Kopecky and Mudde 2003, Rupnik 2007).  Table 6 
shows the left-right placement of respondents in a 
sample of West and East European countries, both in 
1990, at the start of transition, and more recently in 
2005, using the World Values Survey item for left-
right placement on a ten-point scale. Respondents at 
the extremes (‘1’ and ‘10’) are classified as extreme 
left and right, respectively, while those in between 
are classified as centrist. It can be seen that while 
levels of ideological polarization in Western Europe 
have remained low and stable, in this sample of East-
ern European countries radicalization has increased. 
Yet the overall level remains low, both as an overall 
proportion of the population, and also by broader in-
ternational comparison.5 Thus extremism in Central 
and Eastern European politics may appear worrying 
from the Western European perspective, but is funda-
mentally very mild in comparison with other emerg-
ing democracies. 
5   While 6.6 per cent of Eastern Europeans in this country 
sample today position themselves as radical right (‘10’ on 
a ten-point left to right scale), the equivalent figures are 13 
per cent in India, 19 per cent in Indonesia, and 25 per cent in 
Colombia.
The Public Sphere: Rights, Institutions and Political 
Involvement
Empirical research on post-communist civil society 
has paid little attention the public sphere, under-
stood as the discursive space in which individuals 
and groups can discuss matters of collective inter-
est and, where possible, reach common accord on 
important public matters (Habermas 1962 [1989] 
Koller 2010, Clemens 2010).  The public sphere is 
not a part of civil society conceived in organizational 
terms but rather a necessary and constitutive condi-
tion for its existence. Of course, the media as distinct 
organizations are both a part of civil society and pub-
lic sphere. Calhoun (1993) characterizes the public 
sphere as ‘an arena for debating possible social ar-
rangements’ without which the citizen ‘lacks oppor-
tunities for participation in collective choice, wheth-
er about specific policy issues or basic institutions’. 
We may expect the quality and consolidation of the 
public sphere to play a particularly important role in 
conditions such as those faced by post-communist 
regimes, where the success of transition depends on 
the ability of citizens to understand the new ‘rules of 
the game,’ including voting rules, the platforms of 
the major political parties, the process of privatisa-
tion, and new citizen rights granted constitutionally.
A sense of the extent of civic debate and exchange 
is given by the measures detailed in Figure 8, 
which shows two readily available indicators of the 
strength of the public sphere: the per capita rate of 
daily newspaper circulation, and the proportion of 
the public who consider themselves to be ‘very’ or 
‘fairly’ interested in politics (World Values Surveys 
1981-2007, UNESCO 2008). With regard to news-
paper circulation, some parts of the post-communist 
space, such as Central Europe and the Baltic states, 
fare substantially better than the Southern European 
states of Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, which 
are in turn comparable with post-Soviet Europe, and 
substantially better than central Asia. Looking at the 
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data for self-reported interest in politics, post-com-
munist civil societies even appear to be in the lead, 
as the sub-region with the highest level of political 
interest is central Europe and the Baltic states, fol-
lowed secondly by Western Europe. Notably, in all 
post-communist regions political interest is greater 
than in the southern European states of Spain, Italy, 
Greece and Portugal. While political interest appears 
to have declined since the heady years of the transi-
tion, it is notable that levels remain comparable to 
those of Western Europe. 
Measures of cognitive mobilization do not indicate 
any deficiency in post-communist Europe. It is pos-
sible that higher levels of political interest are a re-
sult of the tumultuous experience of economic and 
political transition, and therefore will prove transi-
tory. Yet data from the earliest wave of the World 
Values Surveys, conducted before the transition dur-
ing 1982 in communist Hungary, and in 1984 in a 
 Year Extreme Left Center Extreme Right 
     
France 1990 5.1 93.2 1.8 
 2005 9.1 88.1 2.8 
Italy 1990 8.5 88.8 2.8 
2005 4.9 91.9 3.2 
Netherlands 1990 2.5 95.0 2.5 
 2005 2.7 95.2 2.1 
Sweden 1990 1.2 94.8 4.1 
2005 2.7 94.1 3.2 
Great Britain 1990 3.1 93.5 3.4 
 2005 3.8 93.8 2.5 
West Germany 1990 0.9 97.5 1.7 
2005 3.1 95.6 1.3 
     
Western Europe Average 1990 3.5 93.8 2.7 
 2005 4.4 93.1 2.5 
     
Poland 1990 3.6 88.6 7.9 
2005 4.5 85.7 9.9 
Romania 1990 1.7 95.6 2.8 
 2005 6.0 85.4 8.6 
Slovenia 1990 2.5 94.9 2.6 
2005 6.8 86.8 6.4 
East Germany 1990 2.2 96.2 1.6 
 2005 6.5 92.2 1.4 
     
Eastern Europe Average 1990 2.5 93.8 3.7 
 2005 5.9 87.5 6.6 
     
Table 6: Ideological Polarization among Survey Respondents, 1990-2 and 2005-7
Source: World Values Surveys, waves 2 (1990-2) and 5 (2005-7)
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sample site in Soviet Russia, show an equally strong 
commitment to political debate, suggesting that the 
high levels of media consumption and political inter-
est are reflective of a deeper tendency in the former 
communist bloc. At that time, the proportion claim-
ing to be ‘very’ or ‘quite’ interested in politics was 
also exceptionally high – 66% in Hungary and 61% 
in the Soviet Union6. In addition, for the Hungarian 
survey the public were also asked how often they 
spent discussing politics with their friends, to which 
67.8% claimed to hold such discussions on a ‘fre-
quent’ or ‘occasional’ basis. This would suggest that, 
6   For comparison, the most recent figures are 37% in both 
France and Italy, and 44% in the UK.
far from exhibiting political disillusionment or with-
drawal, ‘cognitive mobilization’ was already feature 
of the late communist era and has survived into the 
transition period. Contingent aspects of the commu-
nist experience may explain why the initial level was 
much higher than in the west, including the legacy 
of mass literacy, but also, the confrontation with an 
official ideology, either in support or in opposition.
If we compare these figures with the formal institu-
tions – freedom of the press and civil liberties – with-
in which a flourishing public space could emerge, we 
can see that regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 
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began the transition with much lower levels of initial 
variation. Figure 9 shows this variation, and the sub-
sequently trajectories of democratic consolidation. 
The political regimes that replaced communist sys-
tem has evolved in to the entire spectrum of regime 
types, ranging from fully consolidated liberal de-
mocracies in East Central Europe to “oriental tyran-
nies” of Central Asia with a range of hybrid regimes 
in between (Ekiert, Kubik and Vachudova 2007). It 
should not surprise anyone that such diverse politi-
cal developments shape the nature of civil society in 
various post-communist countries and define its au-
tonomy and capacity to pursue its goals. In countries 
that reverted to authoritarian rule, civil societies are 
highly constrained and deprived of a legally protect-
ed public space. The associational life is dominated 
by state sponsored and controlled associations and 
independent civil society actors face many restric-
tions, constraints, threats and repressions often akin 
to those they had faced in late communism. Is it the 
case, as the weakness of civil society argument im-
plies, that improvements in press freedom and as-
sociative rights in central and southeastern Europe 
coincided with citizen withdrawal from associational 
life, political debate, media discussions, and civic 
fora? 
In the countries of East Central Europe the quality 
of public space, as measured by the Freedom House 
index of civil rights and political liberties and the in-
dex of Press Freedom, is similar today to one in es-
tablished Western democracies. Countries of South-
eastern Europe have made considerable progress in 
improving the quality of public space as well, while 
other sub-regions either did not make any progress 
(Central Asia) or register significant decline after ini-
tial improvement (the remaining part of the Soviet 
Union except for Baltic republics) during the last 
decade or so. Thus, in this dimension so important 
for civil society condition and development the dif-
ferences between various post-communist countries 
are enormous.
But public sphere is not only a system of enabling 
legal rights and guaranties. It is also a system of insti-
tutions that secure, regulate and translate into reality 
these fundamental rights. Measuring the institutional 
dimension of public sphere is more difficult but the 
USAID index of NGO sustainability can serve as a 
good proxy. 
The index measures NGO sustainability along seven 
dimensions: legal environment, organizational ca-
pacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provi-
sion and public image. The comparison of all post-
communist societies mirrors the picture generated 
by comparing the rights and freedoms. There are 
striking differences among parts of the former Soviet 
bloc with East Central Europe showing considerable 
and consistent gains and with Central Asia and other 
countries of the former Soviet Union (except for Bal-
tic republics) showing considerably less friendly en-
vironment for civil society organizations.   
Estimating the Impact of Civil Society on Demo-
cratic Consolidation
Does it matter that previous studies of civil society 
have tended to focus largely on narrow measures of 
declared membership in voluntary association, to the 
expense of other dimensions of civil society structure 
and activity? We believe that it does. The civil soci-
ety literature suggests a range of mechanisms linking 
aspects of social and civic life to democratic transi-
tion and consolidation, and a narrow focus on mem-
bership, risks missing the dimensions of civil society 
most relevant to the flourishing of democratic gover-
nance. Pluralist theories of democracy, for example, 
following in the tradition of Robert Dahl (1961), 
stress the representative role of civil society groups 
and organizations in setting the agenda of democratic 
politics, thereby ensuring outcomes that reflect a suf-
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ficiently wide spectrum of public opinion. This view 
suggests the density of civic organizations, and in 
particular membership of organizations such as la-
bor unions, business groups, or groups that represent 
salient social issues, competition among organiza-
tions and normative pluralism as an indicators of the 
health of democratic life. On the other hand, a tradi-
tion in political culture dating back to Alexis de Toc-
queville, though more recently expounded by Robert 
Putnam (2000, 2002, 2003), sees civic organizations 
as mechanisms of democratic socialization - ‘schools 
of democracy’–where citizens are socialized into the 
norms of democratic life such as debate, negotiation, 
and compromise. From such a perspective, it makes 
sense to adopt more inclusive definition of civil so-
ciety and to track membership in more apolitical lo-
cal voluntary groups, and participation in communal 
activities. Another, third tradition in behavioral po-
litical science sees the role of civil society organi-
zations as a means of holding politicians to account 
through acts of direct contestation, for example, or-
ganizing mass demonstrations when politicians re-
nege on campaign promises, are exposed in corrup-
tion scandals, or violate constitutional norms. If this 
is how civil society affects political outcomes, then 
we ought to measure the propensity of citizens to en-
gage in ‘contentious’ activities, such as strike, peti-
tions and boycotts, rather than more passive mem-
bership in association, which may not have the same 
effect upon institutional accountability. Finally, there 
is the view associated with Jürgen Habermas, that a 
constitutive part of vibrant civil society is a ‘public 
sphere’, a forum in which diverse public opinions 
can engage one another, and an overlapping consen-
sus emerge regarding the best policy options. Such 
a mechanism leads us to focus on legal guaranties 
ensuring equal access to the public domain as well 
as on civic participation in the media, both as readers 
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and as contributors to the public debate, for example 
by writing letters to newspapers, running internet 
blogs, or attending local town meetings, as well as 
the legal guaranties that allow public communication 
to flourish. 
 
Having noticed the variation in the organization 
and strength of civil society across post-communist 
countries on a range of dimensions, in this section of 
the paper, therefore, we test to see how much of the 
variation in democratic outcomes can be explained 
by variation. We do so via a series of cross-national 
time-series regressions, using as our dependent vari-
able the level of democracy, and as our independent 
variables, a battery of civil society indicators, socio-
economic controls, and the dependent variable for 
democracy lagged to t-0. 
The dependent variable used is the combined score 
of the Freedom House indices for political rights and 
civil liberties, which are then inverted to produce a 
12-point scale from 2 (full dictatorship) to 14 (full 
democracy). Panels are arranged on a 5-year basis, 
with independent variables set to a lag of 10 years 
to reflect the realistic duration required for social 
changes to exhibit an effect upon political institu-
tions. The lagged dependent variable, the country’s 
Freedom House score from 10 years prior, is includ-
ed as the extent of earlier liberalization will naturally 
determine the trajectory of future reform, and we 
wish to control for potential endogeneity between 
earlier democratization and the existing build-up of 
civil society. Second, we include a control for log 
GDP per capita, lagged by ten years. The earliest 
studies have shown a significant positive effect of 
economic development upon the emergence of de-
mocracy, as well as the likelihood of adverse shifts 
away from democratic government (Przeworski and 
Limongi 2000). A control is also included for ethno-
linguistic and religious fractionalization, which has 
been widely argued to affect the likelihood of suc-
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cessful democratic transition (Chua 2003, Snyder 
2001), taken from the Alesina et al. (2003) dataset. 
Finally, we include each of four measures of civil so-
ciety development, lagged by 10 years – an index of 
protest behavior taken from the World Values Sur-
vey, membership of voluntary organizations, again, 
taken from the World Values Survey, daily newspa-
per circulation per 1,000, as reported by UNESCO, 
and connections to international NGOs, from the 
LSE Civil Society Yearbook (World Values Surveys 
2008, London School of Economics 2003). 
Regressions are conducted across three sub-samples 
of the data: first, across countries experiencing dem-
ocratic transition; second, across all countries; and 
third, across ex-Communist regimes only. We present 
these sequentially. First, Table 7 shows results from 
the initial three sets of models, in which we restrict 
the sample to all polities in which there was a move-
ment from ‘not free’ to either ‘party free’ or ‘free’ on 
the Freedom House indices during the period from 
1980 to 2005. Our guiding hypothesis is that liber-
alization of autocratic regimes often begins with the 
initiative of reformist elites, but after this point, there 
is an opening in which civil society can help facili-
tate a transition to fully democratic rule: where civil 
society is sufficiently robust, such a transition ought 
to be more likely; where, by contrast, civil society 
groups are co-opted, clientelistic, or simply absent, 
popular pressure upon reforming elites to deliver fur-
ther liberalization is weaker (Przeworski 1991).
Membership of voluntary associations, the most 
popular measure of civil society strength, is not a 
significant predictor of democratic transition. In-
deed the size of the coefficient does not exceed the 
standard error, and is significantly negative when in-
cluded with other civil society variables (Models 5 
and 6). On the other hand, all of our supplementary 
measures of civic strength are significant predictors 
of the degree of a country’s democratic transition. 
Consistent with the recent focus of behavioral politi-
cal science upon protest activity (Norris 2002, Dal-
ton 2005), civic participation in protest does predict 
successful democratic consolidation, both uniquely 
(Model 4) and in combination with other civil soci-
ety indicators (Model 6). Meanwhile, consistent with 
the findings of Paxton (2002), the density of interna-
tional civic activism also predicts future democratic 
consolidation, both alone (Model 3) or jointly (Mod-
els 5 and 6). Following the results of the regressions, 
a one-standard deviation increase in protest behavior 
at t-1 is associated with a 0.775-point increase on the 
12-point freedom house scale, while a one standard 
deviation increase in initial INGO participation is as-
sociated with as much as a 3.464-point increase in 
subsequent democratic consolidation. Newspaper 
circulation at t-1 is also a significant predictor of sub-
sequent successful transition (Model 2); though is 
not robust to the inclusion of the measure for INGO 
density, most likely due to collinearity between these 
items. 
It is possible that in choosing to select only countries 
undergoing regime transition, the regressions in Ta-
ble 7 introduce sample bias; in particular if there are 
either authoritarian regimes or failing democracies 
that possess strong civil institutions. Table 8 there-
fore shows results from the second of these three 
sets of models, conducted across the entire sample of 
countries for which there is available data - includ-
ing both consolidated democracies and authoritarian 
regimes which have not experienced transition.  
Once again, participation in protest activities, such 
as petition, boycott and demonstration, continues to 
predict successful democratic consolidation, both 
uniquely (Model 9) and in combination with other 
civil society indicators (Model 11). The coefficient 
for INGO density has become more weakly signifi-
cant (Model 10): and we suspect this may reflect the 
inclusion of countries such as Rwanda or Sudan, 
namely in which there are higher levels of INGO 
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presence due to donor-dependency, but fragile pros-
pects for democratic consolidation. Again, the coef-
ficient for voluntary associational activity is either 
non-significant (Model 7) or negative (Model 11). 
Finally, it might be argued that the attributes requisite 
for democratic transition are condition upon the attri-
butes of the former regime, and specifically, whether 
we are treating a transition from communist rule or 
from some other form of authoritarianism. Because 
transition from communism is a dual transition that 
requires the development not only of a democratic 
polity, but also of a viable market economy, certain 
kinds of civic organization – such as NGOs involved 
in providing micro-finance to small businesses or ex-
pertise in business administration – may have a par-
ticular role to play in ensuring the viability of the 
consolidation process. Table 9 reports results con-
ducted just across the sample of former Communist 
regimes, following the same model specifications as 
those of earlier regressions. 
       
Dependent variable: Combined Freedom House Scores for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1-14 (14=full 
democracy) 
       
 Sample: All democratizing states    
       
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Combined Freedom House 
Score, lagged (10-yr) 
0.335   
(0.083)*** 
0.313   
(0.079)*** 
0.311   
(0.079)*** 
0.363   
(0.078)*** 
0.237   
(0.1)* 
0.201   
(0.106) 
Voluntary associational 
memberships, lagged (10-yr) 
0.903   
(1.094) - - - 
-1.59   
(0.891) 
-2.646   
(0.849)** 
Newspaper circulation, lagged 
(10-yr) -
2.312   
(0.817)** - - 
0.787   
(0.836) 
1.163   
(0.881) 
Participation in boycotts, 
petitions and demonstrations, 
lagged (10-yr) 
- - 0.775   (0.365)* -
1.025   
(0.638) 
2.008   
(0.549)** 
INGO density, lagged - - - 2.222   (0.961)* 
3.464   
(1.508)* 
4.95   
(1.494)** 
Ethnic-religious 
fractionalization 
0.477   
(0.558) 
0.684   
(0.487) 
0.815   
(0.519) 
0.205   
(0.416) 
1.581   
(0.75)* 
0.95   
(0.76) 
Log GDP per capita, lagged 
(10-yr) 
2.311   
(0.406)*** 
1.013   
(0.397)* 
2.114   
(0.397)*** 
0.932   
(0.28)** 
1.817   
(0.701)* -
Constant -12.822   (3.986)** 
-1.035   
(3.748) 
-10.805   
(3.684)** 
-2.378   
(2.571) 
-10.338   
(6.363) 
5.702   
(1.596)** 
              
       
n 73 108 82 164 46 46 
r2 0.47 0.37 0.49 0.28 0.62 0.55 
       
      
5-year panels.  
Included in the panel are all countries for which there was a movement from ‘not free’ to either ‘partly free’ or 
‘free’ during the period from 1980 to 2005, following Freedom House classifications. 
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level; † significant at 
the 0.1 level 
Table 7: Cross-National Times Series Regressions (1) on Democracy: 
All Countries Experiencing Regime Transitions, 1989-2005
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Across the sub-sample of former Communist states, 
we find again that lagged INGO density and partici-
pation in boycotts, petitions and demonstrations are 
significantly positively associated with future level 
of democracy, whereas membership of local volun-
tary associations has a negative association (Mod-
els 12-14). The size of the coefficient estimates is 
broadly comparable to earlier models; restricting to 
the sub-sample of former Communist regimes, how-
ever, reduces their significance by inflating standard 
errors. 
            
      
Dependent variable: Combined Freedom House Scores for Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1-14 
(14=full democracy) 
     
Sample: All countries    
     
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Combined Freedom House Score, 
lagged (10-yr) 
0.311   
(0.06)*** 
0.408   
(0.055)*** 
0.23   
(0.055)*** 
0.519   
(0.047)*** 
0.271   
(0.073)*** 
Voluntary associational 
memberships, lagged (10-yr) 
0.181   
(0.77) - - - 
-0.893   
(0.346)** 
Newspaper circulation, lagged 
(10-yr) -
0.017   
(0.274) - - 
-0.375   
(0.227) 
Participation in boycotts, petitions 
and demonstrations, lagged (10-
yr) 
- - 0.766   (0.255)** -
1.222   
(0.363)** 
INGO density, lagged - - - 1.115   (0.667)† 
0.951   
(0.909) 
Ethnic-religious fractionalization 0.093   (0.371) 
1.186   
(0.255)*** 
0.197   
(0.331) 
0.07   
(0.274) 
0.501   
(0.395) 
Log GDP per capita, lagged (10-
yr) 
1.528   
(0.239)*** 
0.237   
(0.326) 
1.473   
(0.244)*** 
0.725   
(0.187)*** 
1.234   
(0.333)*** 
Constant -5.663   (2.116)** 
-3.705   
(2.266) 
-4.53   
(2.171)* 
-1.508   
(1.577) 
-3.575   
(2.885) 
            
      
n 147 294 130 191 101 
r2 0.63 0.56 0.58 0.57 0.68 
            
      
5-year panels.  
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant at the 0.001 level; † 
significant at the 0.1 level
However, while membership of local NGOs here is 
negatively associated with democratization, other 
measures of organizational capacity show a differ-
ent result. The USAID produces an annual audit of 
civil society strength for countries across Europe 
and Eurasia, in the form of the CSO Sustainability 
Index, and among the components of the index is a 
measure for Organizational Capacity (USAID 2012). 
Using this measure of the organizational strength of 
the civic sector, we arrive at very different results. In 
Figure 11, we show the partial correlation of Free-
dom House scores in 2005 with the Organizational 
Capacity rating produced by USAID for the coun-
Table 8: Cross-National Times Series Regressions (2) on Democracy: All Countries, 
1989-2005
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tries of post-communist Europe in the 1990s, con-
trolling for the Freedom House score of 1995. It can 
be seen from the positive correlation between these 
items that, all else equal, countries with greater CSO 
organizational capacity in the 1990s were those most 
likely to maintain democratic gains in the subsequent 
decade (the major outlier is Russia: see Figure 11).
These correlations imply that the focus of the weak-
ness of civil society literature upon levels of mem-
bership in voluntary association is not only limited in 
its understanding of civil society, but also misguid-
ed in its implications for democratic consolidation 
across the region. The persistently negative sign for 
voluntary membership may be puzzling, though as 
studies by Berman (1997) and others have pointed 
out, it is not ‘social capital’ per se that is beneficial 
for democracy, but rather, the kinds of civic behavior 
which reinforce the support for and functioning of 
democratic institutions - such as the protest which 
ensures political accountability, or the connections 
to international civil society which ensure the trans-
        
    
Dependent variable: Combined Freedom House Scores for Political Rights and 
Civil Liberties, 1-14 (14=full democracy) 
    
Sample: Ex-communist regimes only 
(12) (13) (14) 
Combined Freedom House Score, 
lagged (10-yr) 
0.223   
(0.111) 
0.226   
(0.107)* 
0.208   
(0.104) 
Voluntary associational memberships, 
lagged (10-yr) 
-1.516   
(0.633)* 
-1.301   
(0.589)* 
-1.378   
(0.576)* 
Newspaper circulation, lagged (10-yr) -0.706   (0.683) 
-0.72   
(0.661) 
-0.529   
(0.606) 
Participation in boycotts, petitions and 
demonstrations, lagged (10-yr) 
2.013   
(0.803)* 
1.722   
(0.742)* 
2.094   
(0.548)** 
INGO density, lagged 3.46   (1.665)* 
3.159   
(1.564)* 
3.756   
(1.339)** 
Ethnic-religious fractionalization 0.705   (0.721) - - 
Log GDP per capita, lagged (10-yr) 0.624   (0.936) 
0.683   
(0.909) -
Constant 1.539   (8.255) 
2.068   
(8.018) 
8.047   
(0.895)*** 
        
    
N 38 40 40 
r2 0.63 0.61 0.60 
        
    
5-year panels.  
Included in the panel are all former Communist countries for which data are 
available.
* significant at the 0.05 level; ** significant at the 0.01 level; *** significant 
at the 0.001 level; † significant at the 0.1 level
Table 9: Cross-National Times Series Regressions (2) on Democracy: 
Ex-Communist Regimes Only, 1989-2005 
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mission of liberal norms, the monitoring of human 
rights, and the financial resources that allow civic 
organizations to provide an effective check upon the 
behavior of elected politicians and salaried public 
officials. In these regards, as we have seen, there is 
variation across the post-communist space such that 
in a number of regions, in particular Central Europe, 
southeastern Europe, and the Baltic states, civil soci-
ety actors do have the resources and structures neces-
sary for making democracy work. 
Such variation is displayed in Figure 12, which 
shows the joint effect of civil society institutions and 
behavior – voluntary association, newspaper circula-
tion, participation in protest, and the extent of con-
nections to international NGOs – upon future levels 
of democracy for countries across the region, esti-
mated using the coefficients from Model 11. 
The one-decade civic effect varies from 1.7 in Croa-
tia, to negative -0.75 in the case of Moldova. The 
effects of civic legacies on democratic consolidation 
are therefore substantial and positive in the case of 
the Central European and Baltic countries, but some-
what deleterious in the cases of Belarus, and the Cau-
casian Republics. 
Conclusions:  Civil Societies in Post-Communist 
Europe 
Though the collapse of communism may seem a 
relatively recent event, it is already the same dis-
tance behind us as was the collapse of Nazi Germany 
and Fascist Italy when Almond and Verba published 
The Civic Culture in 1963. Today, as then, we are 
faced with the same paradox: the relative durability 
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of democratic consolidation in the face of apparently 
weak participation in civil society organizations reg-
istered by the surveys. Just as Almond and Verba dis-
tinguished different dimensions of civic orientation, 
we suggest that scholars should take into account dif-
ferent dimensions of civil society. Post-communist 
civil societies are not as feeble as is often assumed. 
Many possess vigorous public spheres and an active 
associational life, with civil society actors influenc-
ing policy outcomes on local and national levels. 
Moreover, after examining the different dimensions 
of civil society organization and behavior we find no 
evidence of deterioration over time, as the decline of 
older organizational forms is balanced by the arrival 
of new organizations and expanding ties to interna-
tional civil society. 
By pursuing a multidimensional strategy for analyz-
ing the constitution of civil society and civic behav-
ior – that is, by measuring organization and behav-
ior of civil society actors along a range of different 
dimensions and using a range of different sources 
rather than by a single concept or instrument, such 
as the number of voluntary associations – we have 
been able to present a picture of post-communist 
civil society that is more complex and more inter-
esting. It is evident as to the extent to which prior 
studies of civil society have tended to be narrowly 
focused on just one dimension of civic life - typi-
cally membership in voluntary organization - and on 
a limited set of data sources, typically, public opinion 
surveys. Furthermore, we are forced to abandon any 
simplistic generalizations regarding the ‘weakness of 
postcommunist’ civil society or its ‘demobilization’ 
following democratic transition, as many individual 
indicators tell a contrary story. 
As a result, we can begin to resolve some of the para-
doxes highlighted at the start of this paper. The seem-
ingly strong, active and mobilized civic movements 
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(Coefficients from Model 11)
Joint estimated effect of voluntary association, newspaper circulation, participation in protest, and the extent 
of connections to international NGOs upon level of democracy ten years hence, controlling for income per 
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of the transition period did not become weak after 
democracy was established, but rather, have subsided 
into more routinized forms of organization, represen-
tation, contention and political debate. The associa-
tional structures of the communist era have indeed 
somewhat weakened, but they are still there, and are 
being steadily supplemented with new domestic and 
international organization, networks and ties. And 
the diverging political trajectories across the post-
communist space do indeed reflect different civic en-
dowments at the start of the transition era - but these 
civic legacies should be understood multidimension-
ally, in terms of the public space, normative orienta-
tions, modes of behavior, and organizational struc-
ture that different parts of the post-communist space 
have inherited from their past and modes of transi-
tion. Interestingly, the pattern of institutional perfor-
mance and civil society organization and behavior in 
the Europe of the first decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury, bears some resemblance to that in the Europe of 
the first decade of the twentieth (Ekiert and Ziblatt, 
forthcoming). And as the experience of communism 
is succeeded by new processes of European integra-
tion and development of transnational civil society, 
this legacy will be increasingly submerged under 
new patterns of civic and associational life, different 
again from both the recent and distant historical re-
cord; while the term ‘post-communist’ will become 
steadily redundant as a means of describing political 
reality. 
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